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Abstract 
This thesis argues for interdisciplinary dialogue between transnational memory studies and 
political and social theories of globalisation. To do so it intervenes in a particular debate that 
has occurred between these research fields. Opening with Fredric Jameson’s claim that 
memory has little contemporary significance for political action, it pits this claim against 
rebuttals from memory studies writers. However, this thesis also argues that Jameson’s 
approach ‘utopian’, future-orientated, political project offers a heightened sensitivity to 
questions of aesthetic and cultural representation, and that as such remains of vital importance 
to the field of memory studies. To unpack this proposition, this thesis compares Jameson’s 
utopian approach with and an edited collection by Andreas Huyssen, a seminal theorist for 
memory studies, titled Other Cities, Other Worlds: Urban Imaginaries in a Globalizing Age 
(2008) and critic of Jameson’s utopian theory. This project therefore critically explores the 
opportunities for solidarity with regards to questions of globalisation that an interdisciplinary 
reflection on memory studies and political and social theory can offer. To do this three themes 
common to Jameson’s work and the collected essay are investigated in three chapters: urban 
space, difference, and fundamentalism. 
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Introduction 
 
Both personal and collective memory have become functions in crisis to which 
it is increasingly problematical to appeal [supposing] as against Proust, that it 
is memory itself that has become the degraded repository of images and 
simulacra, so that the remembered image of the thing now effectively inserts 
the reified and the stereotypical between the subject and reality or the past 
itself. (Jameson 1991, pp. 123-124) 
 
In this thesis I argue for the interdisciplinary dialogue between transnational memory studies 
and political and social theories of globalization, and in particular I claim that Fredric 
Jameson’s ‘utopian’, future-orientated approach to culture, politics, and social praxis, despite 
the lines cited above and his critical reception from memory studies, offers solidarity with 
critical approaches of memory studies and makes significant contributions to debates about 
globalization. To explicate this proposal I look to Andreas Huyssen. A seminal theorist for 
memory studies with Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia (1995) and 
Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (2003), and someone who has 
been particularly critical of Jameson’s ‘hopelessly [...] futuristic dimension of utopia in its 
patchworking of a teleological Marxism with a Blochian utopianism.’ (1995, p. 88). However, 
because I am interested in the notion that solidarities are to be found by coming to terms with 
disagreements, placing emphasis upon the subject matter under discussion rather than the 
individuals at work behind them, indeed, my thesis will argue that there are many 
disagreements between the contributors within this text. Firstly, Huyssen lends the text a 
sense of peer-reviewed authority within memory studies, and this is important for identifying 
a case study of memory studies, but secondly there are issues regarding globalization, that are 
shared with Jameson’s work: urban space, difference, and fundamentalism, which make up 
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the chapters of this thesis. Firstly I will introduce why I think that Jameson’s ‘utopian’ 
approach has important implications for memory studies. 
For Jameson[,] postmodern subjects are condemned to a schizophrenic 
existence, bereft of memory and any sense of continuity through time. 
[However] studies of memory and the media, in particular, have sought both to 
develop these ideas and to challenge them by suggesting that to describe 
contemporary media-ted memory as ‘inauthentic’ or debased may be to ignore 
both the complexities of the relation between the media, representation, and 
memory and the potential of media-ted memory for transmitting and sustaining 
memory. (Hodgkin and Radstone, 2005, n. 21, p 22) 
In the essay-film Sans Soleil by Chris Marker (2003 [1983]) a fictional character called 
‘Sandor Krasna’ sends back video postcards of his travels abroad, in turn narrated by an 
unnamed recipient: 
He wrote me: I will have spent my life trying to understand the function of 
remembering, which is not the opposite of forgetting, but rather its lining. We 
do not remember, we rewrite memory much as history is rewritten. How can 
one remember thirst?  
Whilst Jameson may be sceptical about the cultural significance of ‘memory’, I want to work 
with a conceptualisation of memory that Marker works with here: of a memory that is created 
rather than selected from a repository of images and simulacra, degraded or not, and I believe 
that this significantly resembles Jameson’s approach to representation, inherited from 
Raymond Williams, that distinguishes between ‘ ‘‘residual’’ and ‘‘emergent’’ forms of 
cultural production’ (1991, p. 6). Sandor Krasna discovers a means of representing the 
difference between ‘emergent’ and ‘residual’ memories: 
My pal Hayao Yamaneko has found a solution: if the images of the present 
don’t change, then change the images of the past. […] He showed me the 
clashes of the sixties treated by his synthesizer: […] Hayao calls his machine's 
world the “zone” ’. 
In this thesis I argue that Jameson’s criticism of memory can be seen in terms of an 
inheritance from the critical theory of Theodor Adorno such that whilst the corruption of 
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memory is posed in terms of a possibility, not a certainty. Referring to Gillian Rose’s critique 
of Adorno (1978) I argue that such a gesture regarding memory’s relevance has considerable 
potential for being construed as a totalising claim but I argue that the strategy has the aim of 
remaining contemporary to what is represented and what is suppressed, with the hope of 
initiating a post-contemporary, utopian world. 
However, whereas Huyssen rejects Jameson’s utopian project outright, I believe that Hodgkin 
and Radstone’s critical reception of the way that Jameson limits the investigative scope of 
memory leaves open the possibility of solidarity with Jameson’s attempts to push at the 
boundaries of representation. My fear is that Huyssen’s attempt to define the position of 
memory in his introduction to Other Cities, Other Worlds and his earlier work assumes a 
position of academic authority and, therefore, sets limitations upon who has the right to 
engage in such debates.  
Chapters 
Chapter One 
Huyssen argues in his introduction to Other Cities, Other Worlds that cities are ‘primary 
production sites’ (2008, p. 3) for interpreting globalization. Repeating his opening mantra in 
Twilight Memories (1995, p. 1) he argues that in themselves globalization and cities are 
neither panacea or apocalypse (2008, p. 19), but within their study a complex interweaving of 
benefits and pitfalls can be identified. I begin by critically appraising Huyssen’s introduction 
for the way in which it justifies the cultural significance of cities, leading me to what may 
seem an irrevocable problem for my research. Despite Huyssen’s position within memory 
studies, he lowers his commitment to the concept of memory in favour of postmodern, 
creative, ‘imaginaries’. Whilst this resonates with the criticism of Jameson I inherit from 
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Hodgkin and Radstone, and Rose (via Adorno), I explain, as I have suggested above, how the 
intentions behind these strategies, and their implications, are very different. I then go on to 
discuss essays within the collection by Yingjin Zhang, Ackbar Abbas, AbdouMaliq Simone, 
and Gyan Prakash before leading to Jameson’s approach to urban space with ‘cognitive 
mapping’ and how he applies this to  a study of the film Terrorizer in his book The 
Geopolitical Aesthetic (1992). 
Chapter Two 
For Huyssen ‘urbanization and globalization have contributed to making ‘ “other cities” part 
of the way we live and perceive the world’ (2008, pp. 1-2). Similarly, Jameson argues that 
postmodern and global urban space demand (on their own terms, rather than for agency) new 
psychologies or ‘new people’. I begin by explaining how Huyssen suggests a methodology of 
‘bracketing’ that places prominent psychological imaginaries of the west in the background in 
order to give others the stage. I then examine how AbdouMaliq Simone’s proposition that 
urban sub-Saharan Africa psychologies are being shaped by information technology, 
migration, religious community and diaspora life, and his argument that the extremity of these 
conditions makes such a case study of paramount importance for forecasting the psychologies 
of the future. I then examine how Néstor García Canclini, on the other hand, tries to make 
sense of what he considers to be radical incommensurability at both the local and global levels 
between representations of Mexico City. 
In this chapter I move from the comparative underpinnings of Jameson’s theory of cognitive 
mapping to his appraisal of theories of postmodern and globalised ‘new people’ and his 
identification of ‘national allegory’. Jameson suggests that the categorisation of subject-
identities sets significant limitations upon political and social agency. However, in order to 
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reach this proposal I discuss how Jameson’s inheritance from Theodor Adorno (in Late 
Marxism, 1990) raises issues for such commitment to agency by taking a detour through the 
critique of Adorno by Gillian Rose.  
Chapter Three 
Finally I turn to the question of memory’s stakes by considering its relationship with 
ideological entrenchment, violence, and ethics, influenced in part by the pessimism regarding 
the possibility of representation that Jameson's comments on memory seem to suggest. To do 
this I work between the name this is given within Gyan Prakash's essay on religious 
extremism – ‘fundamentalism’ – and Jameson's focus on postmodern ’social simulacra’. I 
begin by looking at Teresa Caldeira’s work on the authoritarian legacy of Brazil’s military 
dictatorship and her critique of the discourse of fear and violence in Sao Paulo. I then return 
to Hilton Judin’s essay and consider the role he allots to the representation of conflict and the 
religious in post-Apartheid South African architecture. Finally I turn to Prakash's depiction of 
Marathi fundamentalism and why he thinks that it shares more in common with modernist 
British colonialism than Marathi traditional culture or religion. Jameson's theory of 
postmodern “social simulacra” considers how religion has become culturally sanctified in 
itself rather than in the traditional sense in which it can be considered as a means of reaching, 
for example, via critical theologizing or piety an achievement of enlightenment or 
redemption. Like Prakash, therefore, Jameson identifies a rupture within the way religion is 
traditionally represented, and I argue that this allows us to explicate and reflect upon the 
pessimism of his views regarding memory in an age of postmodern simulacra. 
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Chapter One: ‘Urban Imaginaries’ 
Introduction  
Andreas Huyssen identifies the main of contribution of Other Cities, Other Worlds as its 
approach to cities; what he considers to be the ‘primary production sites’ of global culture. In 
this chapter I begin by reflecting critically upon this proposal. Yingjin Zhang's essay then 
provides an important basis for a bringing Jameson into the equation because whilst it 
resonates with Huyssen’s theory regarding the role of cities it also challenges Jameson’s 
theory of ‘cognitive mapping’ directly by proposing a theory of ‘cognitive re-mapping’ and 
with a title Remapping Beijing, playing upon Jameson’s application of cognitive mapping to 
the Taipei-shot film Terrorizer in his essay Remapping Taipei (1992), which I return to in the 
second part of this chapter. However, Ackbar Abbas critically appraises what he considers to 
be assumptions within theories of post-colonialism that I believe highlights issues in the work 
of his fellow contributors. Abbas conceptualises ‘x-colonialism’ as the name for a project that 
traces the history of colonialism in order to empower agency with critical perspective. I then 
argue that just such a historical and political commitment can be found within the urban 
memory studies of Hilton Judin on post-apartheid Johannesburg and Gyan Prakash on post-
colonial Mumbai. Turning to Jameson directly, I begin by raising issues with the way he 
articulates ‘cognitive mapping,’ before considering how his reading of Walter Benjamin 
differs to Huyssen’s in its concern with the politics of change. Finally, by looking at his essay 
on Terrorizer, I argue for the first time that Jameson's ‘utopian’ social thought can provide a 
basis for critical solidarity with memory studies. 
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Part One: ‘Urban Imaginaries’  
“Other cities” [...] have left me with a deep sense of wonder and fascination. The more 
diverse my experience of cities has become over the years, the more I have begun to 
wonder what it is that makes up the urban imaginaries both of the cities one inhabits 
and of those one visits, and how such very distinct urban imaginaries reflect and 
contest the notion of cultural globalization. (2008, pp. 2-3)  
Huyssen’s theorisation of ‘urban imaginaries’ is therefore his attempt to provide a 
methodological platform for multiplying the ‘wonder and fascination' that he has felt from 
visiting new cities and cultures. Furthermore, however, he asserts that ‘the very notion of 
culture implies contestation, critique [and] conflict’ and as such any reservations we might 
have which suggest that ‘globalization and global culture [are reductive is] either vastly 
premature or simply a category mistake’. In contrast to the conceptual approach to culture, the 
creativity of cities persists in the ways they ‘continue to condense and thicken cultural 
developments and their dynamics’ (p. 4). To this question he dispels the ‘mistaken 
assumption’ by researchers in the 1970s that due to economic crisis, drug-abuse epidemics, 
and crime, the  
[…] real space [of cities] would yield to virtual space […]. The predictions, of course, 
did not come true. Processes of urbanization everywhere intensified and accelerated. 
Real cities took centre stage in social-scientific investigations of globalization. (pp. 8-
9)  
Despite the problems that are manifested in cities, ultimately 
All cities are palimpsests of real and diverse experiences and memories. They 
comprise a great variety of spatial practices, including architecture and planning, 
administration and business, labour and leisure, politics, culture, and everyday life [...], 
locality is constantly produced anew by our very visible movements through the urban 
sphere, our recognition and renegotiation of the built space of our environment, and by 
all of our interactions with urban life. [...] Urban space is always and inevitably social 
space involving subjectivities and identities differentiated by class and race, gender 
and age, education and religion. (p. 3)  
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As a result the emphasis upon ‘urban imaginaries’ attempts to conceptualize the ‘cognitive 
and somatic image[s] which we carry within us[.] It is an embodied material fact.’ (p. 3 – my 
emphasis) This is because ‘media images, cyberspace, and global popular music connect 
cities with each other’, and it is politically and explicitly articulated by ‘translocal social 
movements around land rights, squatting, and housing or on transnational web-based 
grassroots efforts concerned with human rights or ecological issues.’ (pp. 4-5)   
This does not mean for Huyssen that the conflict that is inherent within culture will always be 
manifested progressively: ‘the future of cities is neither panacea nor apocalypse’ (p. 19), but 
he does argue that cultural exchange:  
Is all the more urgent since the giddy utopianism of the 1990s, with its celebration of 
global flows and limitless markets and its catchwords of glocalization and cultural 
hybridities, received a double blow with the market meltdown of 2000 and the attack 
so 9/11 and their worldwide political effects. (p. 14)  
 At this point I want to introduce my reservations about Huyssen’s emphasis upon cities, or 
rather the way he goes about it. My concern here is for the way in which he feels the need to 
assert the validity of his claims. I think this becomes particularly problematic when he claims 
that ‘[Jean-François] Lyotard’s provocative quip that any work of art has to be postmodern 
before it can become genuinely modern has come true in ways he could hardly have foreseen.’ 
(p. 13) Huyssen does not explain what he means by postmodernism here, but I think we can 
interpolate his essay Mapping the Postmodern (1984) and its identification of cultural 
creativity together with the way in which he considers Jameson’s critique as one-sided (cited 
in my introduction).  As we have seen, Huyssen claims that in contrast to cities, culture is 
inherently dynamic and creative. If this is the case, I think this destabilises his argument that 
the blunting of postmodernism’s creativity by modernism can be any truer today than in the 
past. As a result this also brings into question his assertion that he, personally 
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[…] needs and cherishes accounts of urban imaginaries such as [Walter] Benjamin's 
[in Berlin childhood around 1900] or [Orhan] Pamuk’s [essay on Istanbul that 
concludes Other Cities, Other Worlds], as they conjure up and embody a certain time, 
thus encouraging reflections about other cities, other worlds.’ (p. 21)   
My main, underlying concern is that a heightened emphasis upon particular memories or 
creative imaginaries places a buffer from critical inquiry because of the way in which he 
rebukes fears about the penetration of globalization into localities (he poses that such fears 
only serve to repeat the reductive dialectic of nineteenth century modernism but in reverse; 
the opposite to universal movements such as communism which argued for internationalism 
over the ‘parochial’. [pp. 11-12]) I do not mean to claim that cities are insignificant but 
instead believe that the rejection or suppression of anxieties is politically and socially 
exclusionary, no matter how reductive or uncomfortable such narratives may be. 
Furthermore, however, Huyssen identifies the limitations of this parochialism within the very 
concept of cultural memory by arguing that, today, cities ‘depend on “cultural engineering” 
more than ever to attract capital, business, and power [...] even small cities depend on such 
“Imagineering.” ’ (2008, p. 9) Whilst he considers that imagineering is obsessed with the past; 
a ‘predominant spirit [...] captured by Hegel’s dictum that the owl of Minerva begins its flight 
at dusk’ (p. 8), by placing our critical emphasis on imagineering and imaginaries he hopes that 
we can tap into more contemporary discourses than memory currently offers by engaging with 
postmodern cultural developments. Huyssen therefore proposes that a dialectic between the 
local and the global; initiated by ‘bracketing’ (p. 2), whereby predominant representations are 
placed in the background and difference is brought to the foreground. I believe that just such a 
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dialectic between the local and global can be found in Yingjin Zhang’s analysis of cinematic 
representations of Beijing, and that this can be used to critically evaluate such a strategy. 
As I indicated in my introduction, Zhang argues for a ‘cognitive re-mapping’ that, unlike 
Jameson’s theory, he proposes, is  
[...] not conceived at a high level of abstraction, I am interested in instances of 
cinematic remapping that favour street level views over cartographic surveys, 
contingent experience over systematic knowledge, and bittersweet local histories over 
grand-scale global history. (p. 220)  
For Zhang, Beijing is now characterized by ‘polylocality’: a locality that is represented and 
imagined through an amalgamation of global localities. He argues that this occurs through a 
process by which ‘the local enlists the national in negotiating with globalization while the 
national still counts on the local in exploiting cultural symbolism and popular memory.’ (p. 
221) As a result, the local, the national, and the global all play a role, and the cognitive re-
mapping of micro-narratives facilitates the documentation of this. 
This method leads Zhang to identify the following characteristics:  
Chinese cinema of the new century seems to have discovered in drifting an 
aesthetically gratifying, cognitively challenging, and psychologically complicating 
mode of urban imagination. Drifting captures a raw documentary effect, projects 
fantastic kaleidoscopic images, and enables incessant psychological and emotional 
flows; in its conceptual indeterminacy and sensory immediacy, drifting facilitates 
boundary crossing (local/global), class commingling (rich/poor), and cultural mixing 
(Chinese/foreign), although it implies a disturbing deprivation of agency that 
engenders a crisis in subjectivity. (p. 225)  
Jameson’s essay – which I will soon discuss in more detail – is titled Remapping Taipei, but 
whilst Jameson means to highlight challenges to the notion of urban mapping, Zhang’s 
reference to ‘remapping’ is articulated in terms of a theorization of a cinematic aesthetic of 
drifting - or flux: ‘Beijing no longer provides a set of fixed imaginaries of imperial or socialist 
grandeur [but] the whirlpool of globalization […] exemplified by the virtual-world tourist 
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landmarks in [Jia Zhangke’s] The World’ (pp. 239-240).  There is a constant overwriting of 
‘previous maps and [new ones] being rewritten shortly after – a self-reflexive mode of 
capturing a fast-changing cityscape in a globalizing world’ (p. 225).  
Zhang argues that whilst drifting can be viewed positively because it ‘questions dominant 
systems of thought and institutions of practices’, the dialectical exchange that Huyssen 
theorizes, these films often represent a feeling of ‘ambivalence, contradiction, contingence, 
and improvisation’ (p. 225). In order to engage with these opportunities and difficulties he 
therefore proposes that we should attempt to ‘move beyond the textual realm of urban 
imaginaries and extend critical attention to the circulation and reception of these imaginaries 
in polylocality’ (p. 240); identifying how cinematic drifting is indicative of a broader context 
of local, national, and global urban life. 
However, with Ackbar Abbas’ essay appraises ‘post-colonial theory’ I believe that Huyssen 
and Zhang’s respective claims about the realities of global urban space and polylocality, come 
into question. I eventually theorise this most clearly by turning to Jameson, but I begin by 
considering how. I ground my reading of Abbas’ essay by briefly referring to AbdouMaliq 
Simone’s identification of the ‘urban’.  
Simone contends that for those of us who subscribe to the idea that Sub-Saharan African 
cities are underdeveloped, an affirmation of its ‘urbanism’ – if somewhat ephemeral to a 
western gaze – allows us to acknowledge that 
[...] there are in fact intense levels of urban ‘speculation’. Nothing may seem to be 
happening, but this often reflects a need to be ready[,] a heightened sense of 
engagement with all that could ensue from applying a barely indiscernible gaze, from 
overhearing a conversation, from securing an amongst invisible strategic proximity to 
others, from interrupting the flow of events ever so slightly but powerfully enough to 
move something in another direction (2008, p. 105)  
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Abbas opens by considering that whereas Gilles Deleuze’s cinema theory celebrates the 
‘fragmentation’ of ‘any-space-whatever’, Mario Gandelsonas traces the ‘mutation of the 
suburban city into the x-urban city [whereby] global finance and service industries begin to 
relocate their offices to the suburbs’ (pp. 245-247). ‘X-’ signifies the question of where ‘x 
marks the spot’. Abbas considers how a theory of fragmentation such as Deleuze’s has the 
implication of contributing to what Jean Baudrillard calls ‘simulacra’ whereby the original 
and the fragment derive and reinforce the same genealogy and logic: ‘the original is also a 
simulacrum of the fake, not just the other way around’. The significance of Gandelsonas’ 
work is that by tracing rather than celebrating difference we can be prepared for the 
implications of these changes and provide for the possibility of difference in the future. In 
Abbas’ case he applies x-urban space to the phenomenon of fake brand-stores in post-colonial 
China and Hong Kong. In doing so he contests aspects of ‘post-colonialism’ and theorises ‘x-
colonialism’. 
Abbas considers how the post-colonial theory of Ziauddin Sardar presents the ‘fake as a form 
of resistance against exclusion from the global order of commodity consumption, and even as 
a form of ‘gentle subversion’ against globalization itself’. (p. 260) Abbas argues that this only 
perpetuates the gestural ‘pieties’ of colonialism (p. 249) and  describes the way in which 
American products were mocked during the nineteenth century for attempting to imitate 
European products until they become desirable in the twentieth century. He also asks why 
fakes were virtually non-existent in the People’s Republic of China until the economic 
reforms of Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, even though faking, under Sardar’s logic, might have 
been strategically justified in terms of Maoist resistance and equality. 
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Returning to the urban terms of the proliferation of fake brand-stores, Abbas argues that a 
post-colonial theory of the urban that demands equality on the terms of the colonial also 
retains the colonial ambition of striving for dominance. It therefore articulates a delivery of 
difference, but simultaneously sets limitations upon its potential. Abbas proposes that when 
China becomes known for producing originals it will finally have become a superpower. 
However, whilst Abbas challenges theories of fragmentary difference such as Deleuze’s that 
undergird Huyssen and Zhang’s theories of bracketing and polylocality, Hilton Judin and 
Gyan Prakash challenge the concept and name of the ‘urban’ directly. They argue that it has 
been used to legitimate colonialism and apartheid. 
Judin’s study of Johannesburg begins by providing a genealogy of how ‘productive and 
consumptive spatial arrangements’ (p. 123) were imported by colonialism and modelled upon 
European modernism. He argues that the very concept of the ‘urban’ was used to articulate 
white superiority over a ‘rural’ black hinterland that sought control over technology, 
economics and society. In stark contrast to Huyssen’s assertion that cities are ‘privileged 
production sites’, Judin proposes that after apartheid there have been increasing levels of 
porosity between the rural and the urban, and that whilst this has fed considerable cultural and 
social problems, it can also be a source of reconciliation, coming to terms, and, as an architect, 
great creativity. 
Judin inherits his theoretical approach from Raymond Williams’ study of the city/country 
divide in English literature (p. 131). Williams argues that since the 16th Century cities came to 
represent control and order, but that this representation could only stand upon claims that it 
controlled and ordered a dialectical other; the ‘country’. A geographically isolated city on the 
South African Highveld, Judin explains that Johannesburg has been economically dependent 
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upon the country from its birth, and that it started booming during British colonialism as it 
since it began to draw in Gold on a conveyor belt in the nineteenth century. However, its 
history is also intimately connected with the exploitation of black labour, and therein lays 
another significant aspect of its economic dependency. Narratives of urban sanctity therefore 
operated to consolidate a precarious economic position. Protective gestures about the role of 
the city therefore came to be manifested in 
[…] fears and complaints of Johannesburg in decline have been around for decades[.] 
Our urban history is filled with ravings against the arrival of blacks in the city, ravings 
that have always provided an excuse for official action. (p. 129)  
However, the commitment to urban growth, accompanied by the presence of political 
resistance movements, demanded that South Africa’s division of labour had to be drastically 
restructured. Apartheid was forced to give way, and the arrival into the city of competitive 
black labour, consumers, tenants, and mortgage owners, fed the demand for growth. And yet, 
Judin argues, ‘the self-interest of whites remains at the core of most private commercial 
enterprises and continues to dominate spatial development’. As a result, fundamental 
economic, spatial, and ideological elements of apartheid remain in place (p. 128). Indeed, just 
as the reach of British imperialism and its exploitative division of labour enabled white South 
Africans to integrate with others in the world, globalization now panders to segregation by 
making it easier to ‘get to know [people in] Los Angeles or London, for example – than those 
in the immediate vicinity’, and consolidate a competitive edge that allows them to develop 
strategic partnerships through enhanced connectivity to ‘global circuits of capital.’ (p. 137) 
Likewise, the cultural distinction between the ‘urban’ and the ‘rural’ remains integral to 
justifying white exceptionalism, serving as a platform for articulating ‘fears of invading 
masses, loneliness, dirt, unemployment, crime, declining standard, lack of amenities, lack of 
sanitation and overcrowding are recalled in panic’ (p. 129).  
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Judin therefore argues that, firstly, openness to the cultural discussion of traumatic memories 
is important for coming to terms with apartheid’s legacies and also secondly that a critical 
scope that goes beyond the binary of urban and rural is important for being open to the 
complexities of these memories. In this manner, Judin significantly differs from Huyssen’s 
rejection of memory and the latter’s emphasis upon the urban. However, I believe it is also 
important to consider that Judin does not just argue for the critical and social importance of 
coming to terms with traumatic memory. As I noted earlier, Huyssen considers how ‘urban 
imagineering’ uses memory to create contrived urban heritages, and I think this is particularly 
suggestive in light of Judin’s proposal that: 
[…] in our search for distinct architectural and urban forms we architects have to 
delve deeper into the complex landscape within which we work [enabling 
Johannesburg] to thrive in an increasingly competitive global market of unique 
cultural localities (pp. 144-145).  
Such a commitment to an economically thriving Johannesburg therefore sits strangely 
alongside his Williamsian critique of the urban/rural divide and commitment to incorporating 
social complexity. 
In the final essay that I wish to approach, Gyan Prakash challenges the agency of mourning 
for a lost Bombay; in the memoires of British colonialists but also those who lament a failed 
opportunity for a post-colonial city with revolutionary ‘dreams of universal citizenship and 
social equality’ (p. 182). Such bereavement for modernist ideals, he argues, leaves us ill-
equipped to confront the challenges presented by hegemonic and elitist postmodern urbanism. 
Prakash’s tracking of hegemony can be epitomised by the way Bombay was renamed 
‘Mumbai,’ largely influenced by Shiv Sena, an extremist ethnic-Marathi group. By studying 
this development for its role in the construction of ‘elite’ imaginaries, he documents uncanny 
similarities between British colonial urbanism and Shiv Sena’s anti-urban and anti-western 
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rhetoric, but also its renaming of streets, its reactions against cosmopolitanism, and its bloody 
pogroms against Muslims. 
Firstly, Prakash uses Michel Foucault’s critique of history as a linear ‘rise-and-fall story’ to 
re-evaluate the idea of mourning for a ‘death’ of city. By doing so he suggests that 
[…] the history of the modern city as a space of porosity, multiplicity, difference, 
division, and disruption is concealed when urban change is represented as the 
unfolding of one historical stage to another. (pp. 200-201) 
Secondly, after Henri Lefebvre, Prakash argues that if we want to engage with heterogeneity 
in non-linear terms it is not simply a matter of documenting subaltern narratives of the 
‘congested and miserable slums and chawls in which workers lived.’ (p. 195) In contrast he 
argues that first of all we need a framework that enables us to be open to such narratives. 
Lefebvre’s proposition, he argues, is that we investigate the rhetorical layers of political 
hegemony, because when we look at it critically we find that its claims to authority are 
articulated in response to difference, like Raymond Williams’ city/country dialectic. Lefebvre 
refers to hegemonic rhetoric as ‘flaky pastry’ (Lefebvre in Prakash, p. 192); presenting us 
with an underlying ‘social map of the city’ the more we place it under scrutiny. To go about 
such a study Lefebvre therefore theorizes an engagement with the ‘quotidian’ of the 
hegemonic which, rather than ‘meaningless facts’, provides us with comparative reflection by 
telling us about ‘where people are born, live, and die’. It is for this reason that Prakash’s essay 
is titled The Modern City in Ruins. 
Whereas Judin questions the conceptual role of the ‘urban’ in order to appeal to a more 
flexible reception of memories, Prakash, like Abbas, commits to an analysis of hegemony. 
However, Prakash differs slightly from Abbas’ hunt for ‘x marks the spot’ because of the way 
in which he emphasizes the quotidian rhetoric of space. However, whilst the case studies I 
17 
 
have discussed examine how the urban promotes or obscures discussions of difference, I will 
now argue that Jameson’s depiction of cognitive mapping, and its critical reflection on space 
allows us to be even more critical and culturally inclusive than Judin and Prakash’s critiques 
of the ‘urban’. 
Part Two: ‘Cognitive Mapping’  
Jameson’s approach to questions of the urban and, more broadly, spatiality, is derived from a 
comparative approach to literature, culture, and social and political thought. As a result he 
describes cognitive mapping as a particular strategy of ‘emblematic or allegorical’ theory. 
Jameson asks whether cognitive mapping – originally devised by Kevin Lynch for promoting 
re-mapping of cities by alienated subjects – can provide us with comparative agency that 
allows us to reflect upon a ‘mental map of the social and global totality we all carry around in 
our heads in variously garbled forms. (1991, p. 415) However, since I have been critical of 
Huyssen and Zhang’s claims that we live in a postmodern, globalised and polylocal world, I 
need to begin by evaluating Jameson’s own ‘totalizing’ claims about society: that ‘we all 
carry’, whether we like it or not, a psychological connection with social and global totality. 
As the subtitle to Jameson’s seminal work suggests, Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism (henceforth Postmodernism) inherits an economic perspective on cultural 
studies that most explicitly presents us with his debt to Marxism. By beginning with a 
description of this inheritance I will come to terms with Huyssen’s challenge, noted in my 
introductory chapter, that Jameson’s approach is a ‘hopelessly [...] futuristic dimension of 
utopia’ (1995, p. 88).   
Inherited from the economic theorist Ernest Mandel, ‘late capitalism’ conceptualizes a 
distinction from two earlier capitalist stages: primitive ‘market capitalism’, and its 
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geographical expansion into ‘what Lenin called the “stage of imperialism” ’ (1991, p. 410). 
Late capitalism attempts to represent the development of a stage in which capitalism has 
started to exhaust space and is now investing within culture. However, for Jameson this does 
not mean that the previous stages are completely irrelevant. Like Judin, he inherits Raymond 
Williams’ work, and in this case he refers to residual and emergent dominance (p. xiv). 
Relevant to spatial theory, Jameson asserts that late capitalism retains the way in which the 
‘truth of that limited daily experience of London [ – of imperialism and colonialism’s core – ] 
lies, rather, in India or Jamaica or Hong Kong’.  
As a result Jameson argues that cultural postmodernism thickens these geographic-cultural 
divisions, and a celebration of this situation represents a celebration of a breakdown in 
communication. However, it is my proposal that whilst this presents us with a bleak outlook 
on communication and culture, agency can be found in Jameson’s subtle allegorical approach. 
I believe that this is evident in how he utilizes Kevin Lynch’s model of cognitive mapping 
and yet provides critical reflection upon also. 
For Lynch, Jameson notes that unlike Jersey City and Los Angeles, Boston’s modernist 
urbanism:  
[...] with its monumental perspectives, its markers and statuary, its combination of 
grand but simple spatial forms, including dramatic boundaries such as the Charles 
River, not only allows people to have, in their imaginations, a generally successful and 
continuous location to the rest of the city, but gives them something of the freedom 
and aesthetic gratification of traditional city form. (p. 415)  
As a result, cognitive mapping is far easier in Boston because the object of what we consider 
to be mappable is that much more abundant. The implication here is that the strength of 
cognitive mapping ‘is also its fundamental weakness’ (p. 416) because it comparatively 
highlights a rupture between modernist and postmodern space. As such, Jameson does not 
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argue that cognitive mapping is empowering in itself and nor does he valorise modernist space 
that preceded postmodernity. Instead he highlights spatial and architectural change. He goes 
on to claim, that can be transferred to his approach to memory I believe, that 
[…] cognitive mapping, which was meant to have a kind of oxymoronic value and to 
transcend the limits of mapping altogether [but] as a concept [it is] drawn back by the 
force of gravity of the black hole of the map itself (one of the most powerful of all 
human conceptual instruments) and therein cancels out its own impossible originality. 
(p. 416)  
The suggestion here is that mapping has also been a means by which political hegemony has 
been asserted, and he argues that ‘once you knew what “cognitive mapping” was driving at, 
you were to dismiss all figures of maps and mapping from your mind and try to imagine 
something else.’ (p. 409) 
I want to argue therefore that Jameson is not just committed to retaining memory of mapping 
but that he is politically committed to challenging how culture is both erased and prevented 
from happening and it is upon this basis that I interpret his claim that  
[...] the incapacity to map spatially is as crippling to political experience as the 
analogous incapacity to map spatially is for urban experience. It follows that an 
aesthetic of cognitive mapping in this sense is an integral part of any socialist political 
project. (p. 416)  
Earlier in this chapter I noted how Huyssen identifies his appreciation of particular urban 
imaginaries such as Walter Benjamin’s in Berlin childhood around 1900. In contrast, however, 
Jameson argues that Benjamin theorises a critical and comparative approach to particularity 
rather than a descriptive one and I believe this provides further information about the 
intersection of culture and politics in his approach to cognitive mapping. 
In his analysis of the architect Rem Koolhaas’ Great Leap Forward, a collection of edited 
texts on Chinese state-construction projects in the 1990s, Jameson notes that there are:  
20 
 
[…] thousands upon thousands of buildings constructed or under construction which 
have no tenants, which could never be paid for under capitalist conditions, whose very 
existence cannot be justified by any market standards. (2003, p 66) 
Here even the shopping mall, of which ‘few forms have been so distinctively new and so 
distinctively American, and late capitalist, [is] in crisis, losing money and tenants, and on the 
verge of replacement . . . by what?’ (p. 69) This rhetorical question – ‘by what?’ – is 
fundamental to Jameson’s inheritance from Walter Benjamin.  
With the Arcades Project, Jameson argues that Benjamin attempts a ‘snapshot of the 
nineteenth-century arcade at the moment of its decay’ – what Benjamin calls a ‘dialectical 
image’ – that attempted to ‘understand the present from the standpoint of an immediate past 
whose fashions were already just a little out of date.’ By documenting a particular time and 
place that is just out of date Jameson believes that Benjamin attempts to challenge the 
assumptions we have about how we interpret life, which is also to ask: how do we go about 
interpreting life in the future. This ‘puts us on notice what we have here to do, not merely 
with the archaeology or prehistory of shopping, nor even its present, but rather its future’ (p. 
69).  
As a result, Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping and reading of Benjamin’s dialectical 
image contribute to a conceptualization of a comparative approach that attempts to ready us 
for change by incorporating the memories and imaginaries of the past, therefore 
supplementing Abbas, Judin, and Prakash’s critical approach to the concept of the urban. 
However, I believe that Jameson also goes one step further, reflecting on the cultural 
representation of what I want to consider as ‘post-urban’ society in his study of the film 
Terrorizer. 
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Initially for Jameson ‘Terrorizer is […] very much a film about urban space in general, and 
offers something like an anthology of enclosed dwellings, whether apartments or individual 
rooms’. (1992, p. 153) However, the presence of a Williamsian distinction between the urban 
and the rural is noticeable by its very absence. The film begins in an apartment in Taipei ‘at 
first light, that first vacancy of the city in early morning which will gradually be filled in by 
characters, business, and routines of all kinds’. Dawn is then punctured by a gun fight, and the 
film’s numerous character narratives unpack through 
[…] chance meetings and coincidence [which] allow for a far greater variety of 
character-destinies, and thereby a web of relationships that can be spread out and 
unfolded in a dazzling array of distinct ideological effects. (p. 132)  
 Jameson argues that when the characters come into contact once more, these events only 
serve to multiply ‘unique temporal overlaps’, such that an ever larger 
[…] conspiratorial network unites all these destinies without the full knowledge of any 
single one of them, [lifting and rotating] the gleaming polyhedron of the new form 
before our eyes in ways that confirm it as a unified object and exhibit[ing] the 
unforeseeable glitter of its unexpected facets.’ (p. 133)   
In this sense the problems that the characters face can only ever be a ‘system-specific 
phenomenon’. Even if we suppose that the film has an ambition to represent the 'mutilations 
of the city' upon its subjects, Jameson argues, there is nonetheless a dependency upon and 
acceptance of the limitless horizon of the urban. 
The implication for the concept of the urban, and the basis for my suggestion that there may 
be a post-urban representational focus at work, is found in the ‘degree-zero’ space of the 
photographic dark-room as murder scene: 
[…] sealed off into darkness by the photographer: the act thereby [betrays] the 
essential characteristic of all these dwelling spaces, which function in one way or 
another, and which are somehow incomplete and spatially parasitic on it (p. 153).  
22 
 
The sealing off of the dark room represents an attempt to prevent communication between its 
contents and the outside world, and without the representation of the differentiation between 
the inside and the outside, the basis for the urban’s definition from the rural is destabilised 
such that it takes on a post-urban quality. Without this mechanism the Benjaminian method of 
attempting to grasp what is ‘a little out of date’ is also destabilised – and all the more urgent a 
task for committing to an alternative future. Whereas Huyssen argues that theories of the 
ascendancy of cyber-space over urban space is simply untrue, Jameson highlights the 
limitations that this places on theories of representation and the implications that this has for 
the concept of the urban itself. 
Conclusion  
Despite the determinacy suggested by Jameson's reference to historical epochs and economics, 
I believe his Benjaminian commitment to documenting what has become out of date suggests 
comparative inclusivity to representation in general, and that as such this offers a place, if 
critical,  to trajectories from memory studies. In terms of concepts of the urban, and the case 
studies in this chapter, this provides a platform for discussion that is open because of its 
criticality; to colonial and post-colonial memoires, quotidiens, and anecdotes, as well as 
representations that are current frameworks produce barriers to reception. The political task 
that Jameson presents to us is one of initiating a comparative approach on the cultural-
representational level of the sort that can be found in his study of Terrorizer:  
[From] the most traditional kind of space [the police barracks] to the national space of 
the hospital, the multinational space of the publisher's office (the media, surely of a 
global range now housed in a great glass high-rise) and what I am tempted to call the 
equally transnational anonymity of the hotel corridor with its identical bedrooms.’ (p. 
154) [My italics] 
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Chapter Two: New People 
Introduction  
In this chapter I move closer to the conceptual role of memory by considering the 
psychological connotations present in Andreas Huyssen’s assertion that urbanization and 
globalization have made ‘ “other cities” part of the way we live and perceive the world’ 
(2008, p. 1) and Fredric Jameson’s discussion of postmodern ‘new people’ . I will begin by 
again considering Huyssen’s method of ‘bracketing’ the cities of the global ‘north’ and how 
this translates into a focus upon the imaginaries of peoples from the ‘south’. I then move on to 
investigate AbdouMaliq Simone’s ominously titled essay The Last Shall be First and how it 
depicts psychological pressures and dynamics for Africans in sub-Saharan cities, in 
emigration, and within diaspora communities around the world. I then look to Néstor García 
Canclini and his history of spatial aporias between representations of Mexico City. In Chapter 
One I suggested that Jameson comes close to the historical determinism that I consider to be 
operating in Huyssen’s approach to postmodernity. In this chapter I propose that the question 
of psychological implications represents a more explicit relationship with the possibility of 
agency. To facilitate a study of this question I turn to Gillian Rose’s critique of Theodor 
Adorno (1978) because of the way in which the latter’s work has influenced Jameson’s 
writing. Finally I argue that Jameson’s approach to the prospect of a postmodern 
psychological condition offers a more rigorous approach to difference because of the way in 
which I believe it appeals to the act of comparatively remembering how dominant narratives 
operate.  
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Part One: ‘Bracketing’ 
Huyssen agrees with David Harvey’s proposition that the establishing of the Greenwich 
Meridian in London in the nineteenth century represented capital’s ‘need to manage the 
relation between temporal and spatial distance and proximity on a global scale’ (p. 6); ‘time-
space compression’. However, Huyssen also considers that Harvey presents us with 
(‘Marxist’) economic determinism that is ‘tone-deaf’ to ‘the simultaneous expansion of time 
and space in the imagination’. The challenge, Huyssen argues, is to move beyond a binary 
depiction of this condition by emphasising a ‘time-space paradox’ in which there are both 
new opportunities and problems:  
[...] people in our globalizing world are not just getting closer to each other and 
thus potentially becoming more communal, as Marshall McLuhan had it in his 
catholic and ultimately anti-modern fantasy of the global village. They carry 
with them memories of conflicts and incompatibilities with deep historical 
backgrounds, animosities rooted either in imperial domination, both past and 
present, or simply in fears of otherness, instilled by histories of war, religious 
conflict, and ideological manipulation. (p. 7)  
‘Bracketing’ is Huyssen’s strategy for distinguishing the negative repercussions of 
globalization from its positive and creative imaginaries: 
Together with these developments, a new vibrant literature has emerged among 
political economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and urban theorists across 
the world. [Bracketing] seeks to capture the emerging thrust of urban 
developments in their changing relation to nations and regions, to social 
movements, and to the effects of a globalizing economy and world culture (pp. 
1-2).  
However, whilst Italo Calvino’s book Invisible Cities ‘strikes a chord’ for Huyssen because of 
the way the ‘the title suggests that no real city can ever be grasped in its present or past 
totality by any single person’ (p. 3), Huyssen appeals to us to support the facilitation of this 
condition because. He claims it allows us: 
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[...] to dislocate accounts of modernity from the West [...]. It is simply based 
on the pragmatic idea that we need much deeper knowledge about the ways in 
which modernity has historically evolved in the cities of the non-western 
world, what urban constellations and conflicts it has created there, and what 
such developments might mean today for city cultures at large’ (p. 2).  
Huyssen notes that bracketing is ‘insufficient’; presumably because of the way in which it is 
limited to critical reflection on modernity (Huyssen does not actually describe any issues). 
However, whilst it is important to set the limits, scope, and ambitions of an academic study, 
the collection’s subtitle expands upon the title’s commitment to otherness by making claims 
to insights about urban imaginaries in an age of globalization. As a result I believe that the 
method of bracketing is integral to the cohesion of the collection and requires more 
explanation than is offered. In this context I argue that Jameson’s comparative approach to 
cognitive mapping highlighted in Chapter One provides a basis for doing so. My proposal 
here is that bracketing’s goal of distinguishing ‘other’ imaginaries paradoxically serves to 
reaffirm the centrality of modernism in contemporary discourse. This is not to argue that 
modernism is irrelevant, but that if we are committed to investigating political and social 
agency through cultural forms, such as memory, imaginaries, or creativity, the project of 
comparing forms of modernism serves to consolidate rather than reflect upon its significance. 
I will now argue that this tension is manifested in two of the text’s essays. 
In my last chapter I noted how AbdouMaliq Simone considers that in Douala, Cameroon, 
urbanism is undetectable to the Western gaze. Simone proposes that far from being 
‘redundant’, sub-Saharan urban Africans 
[...] must be able to conceive of a space sufficiently bounded to consolidate 
disparate energies in order to make things of scale happen, but at the same time 
conceive of a fractured space sufficiently large through which dangerous 
feelings can dissipate or be steered away. (p. 103) 
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In psychological terms, he proposes a condition characterised by an intense necessity to be 
ready and an observational dynamic that produces an ‘incessant present’; 
A heightened sense of engagement with all that could ensue from applying a 
barely indiscernible gaze, from overhearing a conversation, from securing an 
almost invisible strategic proximity to others, from interrupting the flow of 
events ever so slightly but powerfully enough to move something in another 
direction. (p. 105) 
For Simone, the reasons for this condition can be attributed to a shift from colonialism to 
globalization, symptomatic in the changing fortunes of secretive Cameroonian societies called 
‘Femla’. In Chapter One I noted Gyan Prakash’s theory that Marathi fundamentalism owes 
more to British colonialism than the tradition and culture it espouses. Similar can be said for 
Femla, because it represents ‘the institutionalization of accumulated knowledge of the city as 
zones of affect’ (p. 111). However, for Simone there has been a radical change in the way in 
which political ‘control’ operates, such that Femla’s often gruesome methods – ‘giving up 
family members as labour to be sold to local plantations or trafficking rings, or as bodies to be 
‘harvested’ for their parts or specific energies’ – are becoming outdated in a globalised age. 
Like the theory of late capitalism presented by Jameson (identified in my first chapter), 
Simone proposes that globalized ‘control’ is characterised by ‘endeavours to multiply 
consumption opportunities’, and this means investing attention to individuals rather than 
heterogeneous groups or masses. This is not to say that the global solely presents favourable 
conditions for the individual. Simone argues that an emphasis on individualisation leads to the 
reduction of the horizon of desires such that, paradoxically, ‘the individual is increasingly 
irrelevant’. This is because capital’s goal of seeking to maximise returns from speculation has 
the implication that it also seeks to minimize the ‘difference between provision and 
consumption’, and that as a result a ‘culture of negotiation and evaluation is therefore reduced 
because items are increasingly valorised in the moment, in the short term.’ (p. 114) 
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However, when Simone moves the focus of his essay to migration and diaspora communities, 
his title – The Last Shall be First – becomes clearer. He suggests that because Africans have 
been faced with such intense conditions at home and in migration this has forced them to 
adapt to the harsher realities of the world than those who are more fortunate. As a result this 
has forced them to develop entrepreneurial skills in order to both survive and thrive. 
Furthermore, despite globalization’s emphasis on individualisation, he argues that African 
diasporas have been supported by new societal forms such as Muslim communities; a support 
network and ‘form of belonging that exceeds the communitarian and the national and works 
toward a proficient, if yet and perhaps always incomplete capacity of collective social action.’ 
(p. 119) Although it is somewhat confusing as to why Simone chooses a Christian reference – 
‘the last shall be first’ (The Bible, Matthew 20: 16) to symbolise the way in which Islam has 
provided a basis for communities faced with emerging economic issues, Simone’s argument 
that communities are emerging which are based on information and culture rather than 
colonial and post-colonial forms of authority and obedience is important in light of my 
Jamesonian emphasis upon social agency. However, I want to argue that Néstor García 
Canclini’s emphasis upon culture and representation suggests limitations for a sociological 
analysis of this type, its psychological underpinnings, and Huyssen’s methodology of 
bracketing the global north. 
Canclini recounts a project in which he presented photographs of Mexico City to inhabitants 
from different social backgrounds; from positions within the state, and between people who 
require varying degrees of movement in order to live their everyday lives, including ‘street 
vendors, taxi drivers, students, [and] transit police’ (p. 84). The project asked participants to 
choose the most representative images of their interaction with Mexico City. Canclini found 
that their narratives did not attempt to grasp the city as a whole but instead describe how ‘they 
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survive by imagining small environments within their reach’. Rather than theorising 
‘macrosocial transformations and the structural causes’, these events were disparately 
attributed to immigrants, political demonstrations, the number of cars, police corruption, 
tripled parking and so on and so forth. Furthermore, however, there was also an imaginary 
emerging within the elite that was particularly distinct in its relationship with time. The 
flexibility that Canclini demonstrates towards the imaginaries of the elites is a fundamental 
component of my argument that an emphasis upon the bracketing of modernity has limitations 
that should not be ignored. 
Drawing upon Walter Benjamin, as do Huyssen and Jameson (discussed in my first chapter), 
Canclini presents an argument that the archetypal modernist city was once imagined by the 
elite bourgeois perspective of the ‘flâneur’, characterised by monadic play with affectation (in 
The Arcades Project ‘the flâneur plays the role of scout in the marketplace’ [Benjamin, 2002 
[1940], p. 21]). In contrast, Canclini suggests, Mexico City’s elite imaginaries are now 
characterised  by eye-in-the-sky TV news; a ‘new panoptic power’ in which the mobility of 
helicopters, like the shift ‘from literary texts to mass, audio-visual media’ promotes a shift 
from the ‘long-form narratives’ of the modern elites, to an urgency of ‘instant flashes’ (2008, 
p. 85).  
And yet despite Canclini’s unease about the incommensurability that he perceives, he also 
suggests that Mexico City’s ‘baroque’ imaginaries are not at all new and can actually be 
traced back to the beginning of European colonisation with the letters of the conquistador 
Hernan Cortes. As a result, I think that Canclini’s essay is significant in the context of 
postmodern ‘new people’ in at least two ways: firstly he suggests that there is a history of 
incommensurability the goes so far back in time that it stretches at the limits of modernism, 
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and secondly, in contrast to Simone, his study of imaginaries is placed firmly within the remit 
of cultural studies and representation rather than psychology. The implications being that 
[...] perhaps one chooses to live in cities not only because of the richness of 
stimuli [but also because] precariousness and disorder give rest to our 
imaginary vertigos [...] against what one finds vertiginous in globalization. (p. 
95) 
Although Canclini frames incommensurability in psychological terms of ‘stimuli’ and 
‘imaginary vertigos’, his mode of investigation, from the sociological research project of 
questioning photographic representations of the city to historical and literary studies is 
cultural. Turning now to Jameson I unpack further why I believe a cultural inquiry moves 
beyond the limitations of the psychological because of the way in which the former is open to 
differences offered by concepts of creativity, imaginaries, and memory. 
Part Two: ‘National Allegory’ 
In her book on Theodor Adorno, Gillian Rose argues that it is one thing to claim, as Adorno 
does, that ‘capitalist society has become more total and that it increasingly controls and 
constrains individuals’, but another thing entirely to claim that ‘philosophy and sociology can 
no longer grasp the totality, neither the whole of existing society nor all its possibilities.’ 
(Adorno, in Rose, 1978, p. 17) I begin this sub-chapter with Rose’s critique of Adorno 
because I consider that it resonates with Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone’s 
response to Jameson’s views on memory with which I introduced this thesis. 
Rose asks how political agency can be possible if ‘complete reification’ and, most relevant to 
this chapter, ‘the end of the individual’ has been established as an intellectual horizon (pp. 15-
18). Rose’s text takes its cue from Adorno’s proposition at the beginning of Minima Moralia 
that a ‘melancholy science’ attempts to articulate an ethical responsibility to representing the 
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unrepresented. Rose argues that if this responsibility is dependent upon a thesis of ‘complete 
reification’, the question arises as to how Adorno has come to the unique position of being 
able to comment on the totally incommensurable. Rose deduces that this can only mean that 
Adorno is using irony, and that as a result this runs a significant risk of elitism and 
manipulation; a schoolmasterly attempt ‘to induce in his reader the development of the latent 
capacity for non-identity thought’(p. 49). Furthermore, however, Rose considers that 
Adorno’s melancholia over totally reified society necessarily leads us to a philosophical 
exercise of asking or saying ‘what something is’ (Adorno in Rose, p. 45). This is important 
for my approach because of the way in which Jameson not only inherits Adorno’s thesis but 
also expands upon it.  
In Late Marxism (1990) Jameson argues that Adorno's work provides particular 
 [...] information about a specific moment of the operation of the social totality 
in its monopoly period: the adherence, indeed, to the ‘state capitalist’ model of 
the economy, a model overtaken by the development of multinational 
capitalism today and no longer current, permits a kind of measurement of the 
‘damaged subject’ [a process that] could be registered in a narrative or mimetic 
form by Adorno (and Horkheimer) because [...] they lived through the 
transitional period in which smaller business and entrepreneurship were once 
visible, so that their absence at a later stage remains a dramatic symptom, still 
perceptible to the observer. This is of course an advantage over our own 
period, in which social homogenization is far more compete, the past has been 
more definitively disposed of, and this kind of temporal or modernist dialectic 
seems inoperative. (p. 71) 
However, whilst Jameson potentially exacerbates the problem that Rose identifies in the 
thesis of totally reified society by claiming that it has finally been realised, I am interested in 
his claim that Adorno provides insight into a particular moment in time that can be 
appropriated for comparative study. In Chapter One I identified issues in Huyssen’s 
appreciation of Benjamin and Pamuk in these terms but I am interested in the Jameson’s 
suggestion that a temporal or modernist dialectics seems to be inoperative.  
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In his preface to Postmodernism, Jameson suggests that the goal of postmodernism 
[...] must remain that of coordinating new forms of practice and social and 
mental habits. [Just as Max Weber claimed] that new inner-directed and more 
ascetic religious values gradually produce ‘new people’ capable of thriving in 
the delayed gratification of the emergent ‘modern’ labour process, so also the 
‘postmodern’ is to be seen as the production of postmodern people […]. (1991, 
p. xiv) 
Jameson means here that the promotion of particular social and mental processes necessitates 
the identification of people and habits that adhere to, thrive, or fail under these conditions. In 
academic terms the prospect of new psychologies and/or societies requires new subjects that 
can be treated as case studies. 
This is where the clause ‘seems’, highlighted above, becomes important because in 
Postmodernism Jameson considers these psychological questions in terms of cultural and 
aesthetic representation. For instance: 
[...] concepts such as anxiety and alienation (and the experiences to which they 
correspond, as in [Edvard Munch’s] The Scream) are no longer appropriate in 
the world of the postmodern. [They have been replaced by] the great [Andy] 
Warhol figures – Marilyn herself or Edie Sedgewick – the notorious cases of 
burnout and self-destruction of the ending 1960s, and the great dominant 
experiences of drugs and schizophrenia. (p. 14) 
 
The suggestion of dizzying, aleatory, and schizophrenic cultural postmodernism leads 
Jameson to engage with poststructuralist debates regarding ‘the “death” of the subject itself – 
the end of the autonomous bourgeois monad or ego or individual’, therefore tying up with 
Benjamin’s proposition – and Canclini’s inheritance – of the model of the antiquated flâneur. 
Most importantly for social agency, and resonant with Canclini’s concern with 
incommensurability, Jameson distinguishes between two poststructuralist approaches to this 
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debate: a historicist approach which he states he ‘obviously’ leans towards (1990, pp. 14-15), 
and a second ‘position, for which such a subject never existed in the first place but constituted 
something like an ideological mirage’. He proposes that the latter position is problematic from 
a point of view of inclusivity. This becomes clearer when we consider his claim that ‘of all 
Marxist aestheticians [Adorno] is the most faithful to Marx’s own method or mode of 
Darstellung [aesthetic, cultural, or rhetorical representation]’: that no concept or mode of 
production should ever become ‘the dominant theme or motif.’ (p. 182)  
The debate regarding the death of the subject is important here because it applies comparative 
analysis to the significance of subjectivity, and in turn provides critical insight into the 
concept of memory. However, this also means that in order to avoid the dominance of 
particular modes of production we need to investigate how they operate on their own terms 
(Adorno later called this ‘immanent critique’ in Negative Dialectics, 1990 [1966], p. 97), 
which is also to say that when Adorno refers to totally reified society, and Jameson inherits 
this in terms of it being fully realised by postmodernism, they are asking how these 
representations operate. I think that this is particularly important to bear in mind when we are 
considering Jameson’s pessimistic views on memory because it suggests that he is referring to 
how memory has been represented and does not define its historical significance.  
However, it is also integral to a consideration of Jameson’ inheritance from Adorno that his 
critique of Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s ‘culture industry’ thesis should be acknowledged. 
Jameson suggests that their German expression ‘kulturekritik’ was actually articulated as 
ideological or aesthetic critique and not cultural in the sense in which it has come to mean 
today: aesthetic representation articulated within a social, communicative, and interactive 
context (p. 107). Adorno and Horkheimer argued that individual bourgeois monads 
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(Benjamin’s ‘flâneur’) were becoming ‘invested with property’ (Adorno in Jameson, p. 71), 
and that this was having a direct bearing upon the rise of bourgeois fascism. As a result, 
Jameson considers that the culture industry thesis depicts how aesthetics and ideology are 
filled with economic and industrial imperatives – extending immanent critique from 
economics to aesthetics – but does not investigate the role that culture may itself play, for 
better or worse, in framing the ‘realm of social life’. I will now consider how his approach to 
cultural studies determines that he not only treats ‘new people’ on a conceptual level, but that 
he approaches difference in a way that maintains a flexible approach to dominance that 
starkly contrasts with Huyssen’s method of applying bracketing to modernism. To do so I 
consider his writing on ‘postmodern difference’ and ‘third world literature’. 
For Jameson, whilst ‘new people’ is theorised as a component of the cultural ideology of 
postmodernism, like modernism before it, he also considers that global media has presented to 
us the ‘emergence of new subjects; that is to say, new people, other people, who were 
somehow not even there before’ (1991, p. 357). However, unlike Huyssen, he continues: 
‘even though their bodies and their lives filled the cities and certainly did not suddenly 
materialize yesterday’ (my emphasis). One cultural field in which he explores differences is 
within what he controversially refers to as ‘third-world literature’. 
In his essay of that title (1986) Jameson argues that ‘the strategy of trying to prove that these 
texts are as ‘great’ as those of the [western] canon [determines that the] third-world novel 
tends to come before us, not immediately, but as though already-read.’ (1986, pp. 65-66) He 
claims that this is essentially what 
[...] Edward Said, in the context of the Middle East, called “orientalism”. It 
does not matter much that the radical otherness of the culture in question is 
praised or valorised positively [...]: the essential operation is that of 
34 
 
differentiation, and once that has been accomplished, the mechanism Said 
denounces has been set in place (p. 77). 
However, Jameson has also been heavily criticised for an authoritarian tone with his claim 
that third-world literature should 
[...] be read as what I will call national allegories, even when, or perhaps I 
should say, particularly when their forms develop out of predominantly 
western machineries of representation, such as the novel [and that] all third-
world texts are necessarily [...] allegorical. (p. 69 – my emphasis) 
For instance, Aijaz Ahmad has protested that: 
[…] when I was on the fifth page of this text (specifically, on the sentence 
starting with “All third-world texts are necessarily . . .” etc.), I realised that 
what was being theorized was, among many other things, myself. (Ahmad in 
Buchanan, 2005, p. 177) 
Here I think it is important to remember Jameson’s allegorical approach, and his inheritance 
from Adorno’s aesthetic, political, and social theory that no mode of production should be 
allowed to be become dominant ’s proposition, as well as how this interacts with ‘totality’; 
another controversial Jamesonian concept. For Jameson, totality serves as a concept for 
tracking narratives that attempt to be dominant; it ‘does not imply a belief in the possibility of 
access to the totality, but rather a playing with the boundary itself.’ (1991, p. 363) Playing at 
the boundary is Jameson’s approach to difference, proposing that we need to maintain a 
vigilance of what the boundaries are for social agency if we are to transgress them. 
Additionally. I noted in chapter one that Huyssen refers to the way that Jean-François Lyotard 
links creativity with postmodernism. Interestingly Jameson also uses Lyotard’s writing on 
postmodernism to theorize the implications of celebrating random difference rather than 
investigating it rigorously. 
Jameson argues that whilst it is certainly tempting to celebrate the irrelevance of the 
pessimistic anxiety of Munch and van Gogh’s modernist psychological ‘sublime’, he argues 
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that what Lyotard calls ‘intensities’ produce a new form of domination characterized ‘by a 
peculiar kind of euphoria’ (1991, p. 16).  
In his forward to Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition Jameson claims, contra 
Lyotard’s celebration of postmodernity, that we have not witnessed 
[...] the disappearance of the great master-narratives, but their passage 
underground as it were, their continuing but now unconscious affectivity as a 
way of ‘thinking about’ and acting in our current situation. (1984, p. xii)  
This builds upon Jameson’s earlier proposition in The Political Unconscious (1982) in which 
he claims that the notion of politics’ irrelevance tautologically relies upon the continuing 
presence of the political as its binary other in order to affirm its own ‘post-political’ identity. 
In this sense the articulation of the silencing of difference by politics is a contradiction in 
terms. In Postmodernism Jameson argues that the pursuit of difference and presenting cultures 
as if they have only just arrived hides its agenda to challenge the concept of the political, and 
as such is a form of: […] oblivion and forgetfulness, a self-deception that does not want to 
know and tries to sink ever deeper into a willful involuntarity, a directed distraction’. 
Moreover, he argues that this is very similar to the quantitative approach of ‘demography’ that 
reduces ‘the precious individual corporality to something trivially biological or evolutionary 
[…]’ (1991, p. 358). 
Returning to the question of third world literature, Jameson claims that:  
I take the point of criticisms of this expression, particularly those which stress 
the way in which it obliterates profound differences between a whole range of 
non-western countries and situations [but] I don't, however, see any 
comparable expression that articulates, as this one does, the fundamental 
breaks between the capitalist first world, the socialist bloc of the second world, 
and a range of other countries which have suffered the experience of 
colonialism and imperialism. (p. 67) 
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By stressing the ‘breaks’, I believe that Jameson is tacitly appealing for a remembrance of the 
role of imperialism and colonialism, and politics and power relations more broadly, so that we 
can pursue an approach that is even more thoroughly attentive to difference. He argues that 
such an approach would allow us to consider that despite the racist and totalitarian 
manifestations of nationalism it has also played an important political rallying point for 
resistance by communities faced with the imposition of imperialist and colonial culture. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have investigated a division between a psycho-social conception of new 
people articulated by Andreas Huyssen and AbdouMaliq Simone, and an aesthetic, cultural, 
and representational approach articulated by Néstor García Canclini and Fredric Jameson (via 
Theodor Adorno). I probed deeper into the basis for Jameson’s claims that memory has 
become insignificant. Whilst I think that Jameson’s comparative and allegorical approach 
attempts to reflect upon the most vocal cultural manifestations and therefore offers significant 
opportunities for social agency, I also believe that Gillian Rose’s claims regarding Adorno’s 
elitist manipulation is important to bear in mind. I agree with Hodgkin and Radstone’s claim 
that Jameson undermines the role that memory can play for critical cultural inquiry. However, 
I also believe that memory studies would be done a disservice if it were to ignore Jameson’s 
contributions to the study of culture’s implications in the context of political and social 
agency. For Huyssen, a commitment to difference can be facilitated by working to give voice 
to creativity that is to be found, as if ready-made in a Warhol object, within postmodernity’s 
specific alterity to modernity. I believe that Huyssen’s emphasis upon this dialectic limits our 
critical and creative possibilities by affirming an underlying binary determinism of the sort 
that Jameson identifies at work in Lyotard’s thesis of postmodernity. The implication of this 
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critique is that alongside Canclini’s study on Mexico City, a comparative cultural analysis 
raises the prospect of limitations in sociological and psychological findings such as those of 
Simone. Like Huyssen, Simone’s study places a barrier between authoritative academic 
expertise and dialogue, whereas Jameson and Canclini’s emphasis upon working from 
narratives that espouse dominance allows us to test the boundaries in a rigorous yet inclusive 
methodological manner.  
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Chapter Three: Fundamentalism 
Introduction 
At the conclusion of n Alain Resnais’ Holocaust film Night and Fog the narrator asks ‘who 
among us keeps watch from this strange watchtower[?]’ (2003 [1955]). The emphasis that 
film makers such as Resnais and Marker (who were frequent collaborators) have placed on 
memory for ethical commitment and to political and social agency is integral to my approach 
to the concept. However, the essays in Other Cities, Other Worlds, including Huyssen’s 
introduction (and theory of ‘time-space compression’), frequently cite the way in which 
memory can be a source of conflict and violence. Furthermore, Jameson’s claim that memory 
has become a ‘degraded repository’ leaves space for the suggestion that it can be appropriated 
by violence and not just cultural industries; ‘the question about poetry after Auschwitz has 
been replaced with that of whether you could bear to read Adorno and Horkheimer next to the 
pool.’ (1990, 248) By reflecting upon this tension in my final chapter I attempt to draw out 
how precarious it can be to work with memory. However, whilst my concern is with this 
tension between an ethical responsibility to avoid atrocity and the manipulation of memory 
for violence, Gyan Prakash’s essay frames this concern in a context that is unexpected but 
both timely and in a manner that provides access to discussion with – and explication of – 
Jameson’s utopian thought; the context of religious extremism or ‘fundamentalism’, However, 
before I reach this concept and its debate, I firstly look at Teresa Caldeira’s analysis of the 
discourse of fear and violence in Sao Paulo and its implications for democracy. By returning 
to Hilton Judin’s call – investigated in chapter one – for an approach traumatized memories, 
the importance of the religious – or ‘sacred’ – comes onto the horizon. I then finally return to 
Prakash’s essay and expand upon his theory – again introduced in Chapter One – that Marathi 
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fundamentalism has more in common with modernist British colonialism than traditional 
Marathi culture or religion, providing a critical appraisal of Max Weber’s claim that 
modernism radically demystifies religion. Using this as a platform I then look at Jameson’s 
dialectic between the sacred and the decadent, and identification of a quasi-religious, 
postmodern form of fundamentalism that he calls ‘social simulacra’ and comes to be 
manifested in the deity of ‘high technology’.  
Part One: ‘Fundamentalism’ 
Writing about Sao Paulo, Teresa Caldeira considers that ‘crime and violence have become the 
most important factors for the articulation of a new pattern of segregation’ (2008, p. 63). 
Caldeira attempts to challenge this discourse, despite ‘fear of crime and violence [being] well 
grounded.’ (p. 64) Caldeira argues that ‘fear is productive’, that it is repetitive by its very 
nature and feeds a cycle in which ‘violence is both counteracted and magnified’. However, 
she also argues that whilst catharsis and trauma management serve to proliferate the demands 
for public justice they legitimate private, illegal reactions and acts of revenge ‘like hiring 
guards or supporting [police] death squads and vigilantism’, therefore feeding into ‘the 
expansion of a booming industry of security services’. I want to consider Caldeira’s concern 
that an obsession with violence serves to restrict ‘people’s movements and shrink their 
universe of interactions’ (p. 64) but I also want to ask whether treating catharsis and trauma 
management in this way is antithetical to social agency. As a result this will also lead me to 
question Caldeira’s approach to concepts of democracy and the political. 
Caldeira explains that the economic crisis of the 1980s destabilised the ideology of economic 
progress that had legitimated both Brazilian populist governments and military dictatorships, 
instigating calls for democratic inclusion in political decision making. However, Caldeira also 
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proposes that this fractured citizenship lit a fuse for psychologies and discourses of fear and 
violence. 
For Caldeira and her colleague, James Holston, Brazilian democracy, post-economic crisis 
can be characterised as ‘disjunctive democracy, a contradictory democracy marked by the 
expansion of political citizenship and delegitimation of civil citizenship.’ (p. 65 - my 
emphasis) As a result, Caldeira equates politics with selfishness, conflict, fear and violence, 
by suggesting that it is counterproductive to the social, communitarian praxis of the ‘civic’. 
To substantiate these claims she argues that the effects of political citizenship can be tracked 
by studying spatial, material, and aesthetic developments in Sao Paulo, and in particular 
‘postmodern fortified enclaves’ and how they are accompanied by ‘aesthetics of security’. For 
example: 
Place des Vosges, a gated theme park that imitates the plan of the original 
square and announces its advantages: ‘The only difference is that the one in 
Paris is public. Yours is private.’ (p. 65) 
The irony of these fortified enclaves is that despite their emphasis upon security and 
consolidation they are actually expanding by forcefully removing economically insecure 
people –the ‘Favelados’ – and undertaken by the city administration in partnership with 
private investors (p. 65). Caldeira argues that forced removal was nothing new to Sao Paulo, 
but that in the past it was veiled by ideological justifications of hygiene and development; of 
‘public responsibility’. In this case ‘the true goal of getting rid of the favelados to increase 
real-estate value was rarely disguised’. (p. 68)  
Caldeira proposes that luxury enclaves have been marketed in terms of distinction from the 
favelas that they cleared, epitomised in the ‘phantasmagoria’ of a restaurant bar called ‘Bar 
Favela’. Furthermore, this bar does not just trivialise the favelas by decorating its walls with 
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murals depicting stereotypical favela crime and violence. The oblivion of how the favela 
came to be replaced by a tacky bar feeds into the issue of social incommensurability that I 
have documented in Canclini’s essay in my second chapter. However, Caldeira uses this case 
study to claim, more broadly, that discourses about trauma, conflict, and politics have 
inherently negative civic implications, and she argues that public institutions should ‘enforce 
principles of social justice’ (p. 75 – my emphasis). In contrast I believe that the process of 
airing traumas, memories, imaginaries, no matter how simplistic or problematic we may find 
them to be, is a vital aspect of the process of opening up to the possibility of difference. 
Indeed, I believe Caldeira undertakes such a task in her focus upon the aesthetics and 
phantasmagoria of security.  
In stark contrast, I introduced in Chapter One that Hilton Judin argues for an engagement with 
traumatic memories. He considers that idealized conceptions of unity have little substance 
unless they can be related to issues and challenges in a contemporary South Africa that is so 
thoroughly defined by racial memory. As I mentioned earlier, he considers that their traumatic 
memories are probably the only things that South Africans share; 
Individuals in Johannesburg must ask how one is able to deal with loss living 
in the city, if you can’t confront it. What exactly does one see in the city? What 
is each of our dominant experiences? Estrangement, maybe, if one is white. 
Discomfort. Invasion. And fear. And if one is black, it might be access. Arrival. 
Also anxiety. […] Each is afraid of the other, and in fear becomes for the other 
that anxiety, reflecting the traumas and prejudices anticipated in each other. (p. 
128) 
Judin describes a legacy of authoritarianism in Johannesburg from British imperialism 
through apartheid, echoing Caldeira such that memories are: 
[...] divided still by white racist constructions, real and imaginary, South 
Africans are unable to share the others’ concerns and aspirations. Whites still 
refuse to step outside their moral vacuum and offer even a simple conciliatory 
gesture (p. 124). 
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Memory in Johannesburg is therefore fortified within racial nostalgia; a ‘nostalgia for an 
irrecoverable past [that] serves to hide an uncomfortable present for which we are responsible.’ 
(p. 130) It can therefore also be considered a neglect of our responsibility to the present. 
Furthermore, he argues that ‘the self-interest of whites remains at the core of most private 
commercial enterprises and continues to dominate spatial development’. 
Judin looks at nostalgia as a survival mechanism. He considers that it has been used to 
maintain power relations after the collapse of apartheid and in broader conceptual terms as a 
strategy for negotiating a ‘city that shifts and changes with enormous social movements [...] 
yearning for lost and unspoiled places is especially strong, as we perceive ourselves caught in 
a present over which we have little control’ (pp. 129-130). In this light he looks to the work of 
Raymond Williams who argues that ‘if the real childhood memory is projected, unqualified, 
as history’ – thus becoming what Williams considers in Marxist terms the ‘dominant mode of 
production’ – this ‘teaches, impresses, offers to make normal and even rigid, modes of 
detached, separated, external perception and enjoying people and things.’ (Williams in Judin, 
pp. 131-132) 
The question then arises as to how to go about tracking ‘traumatic’, ‘nostalgic’, or ‘dominant’ 
memories so that we can come to terms with them. This leads Judin to the role of religion, or 
rather the ‘sacred’. However, Judin’s essay is written from the explicit perspective of an 
architect, and how architecture can make a difference to both South African society and 
economic growth. The sacred is important here because of his claim that ritualistic 
‘movements of influence in both directions offer us new conventions ’ (pp. 144-145). In 
contrast, Gyan Prakash’s essay articulates the role of the sacred in political and social terms 
rather than those of business. 
43 
 
Like Caldeira and Judin before him, Prakash also depicts an authoritarian spectral legacy. 
However, whilst Judin differs from Caldeira’s approach by explicitly asking us to work with 
the politics of the past, he also asks, contra Judin, to work primarily from a critique of the 
imaginaries of the elite, a critical method, rather than document the heterogeneity of traumatic 
memories. 
Prakash also argues that memory has a relationship with survival, explicating his thesis that 
contemporary Marathi fundamentalism is a legacy of pressures to either adhere to British 
colonialism or negotiate its presence; ‘there was never any doubt that entry into this urban 
order was conditional on the acceptance of colonial authority’ (p. 188). By tracking the 
dictates of authority Prakash therefore provides a means of becoming alert to contemporary 
social issues such as the way in which – despite their explicit nationalism – Shiv Sena 
continue the legacy of the British by 
[…] renaming streets, public institutions, and Bombay itself, [...] through 
religious and political processions and celebrations [and the] use of violence in 
daily political activity and in bloody spurts of communal pogroms against the 
Muslims, as in 1992-93 [...]. (p. 199) 
Prakash develops his research on the basis of a conceptualisation of cities, after Michel 
Foucault, as inherent spaces of political ‘collision and confrontation’. In order to uncover 
these conflicts he proposes, following Henri Lefebvre, that we should firstly investigate 
‘quotidians’, because ‘to understand the present imaginary it is necessary to discover the 
shape of the imaginaire it now remembers as its past’ (p. 185), and secondly, again after 
Lefebvre, he considers that we need to begin from elite imaginaries rather than those of the 
oppressed. His suggestion is that the fragilities and inconsistencies of authority become 
apparent when placed under scrutiny because of the way in which it needs to adapt to 
disparate circumstances if it is to remain significant,. By investigating authority we are 
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provided with a means of remaining ready to accept difference. To spearhead such a study, 
Prakash uses the dialectic of the sacred and the evil. Contra Max Weber he asks the rhetorical 
question: ‘was modernity not the space of new gods and new myths?’ (p. 187) 
Part Two: ‘Social Simulacra’ 
To approach the significance of fundamentalism in Jameson’s work I want to consider his 
argument in the essay Marx’s Purloined Letter (1995) for a common political project between 
his own work, that of Karl Marx, and Jacques Derrida that has otherwise not been considered. 
I want to propose that in their respective approaches to the question of the sacred that this 
becomes difficult for the theory of utopian political thought I am putting forward. 
Derrida’s Specters of Marx (2006 [1993]), to which Jameson’s essay responds, refers to the 
famous opening words of Marx and Engels’ Communist Manifesto: ‘a spectre is haunting 
Europe, the spectre of communism’. Jameson interprets Derrida’s text as a proposition 
whereby ‘the absence of the problem of materialism [and] the impossibility of posing it as a 
problem as such and in its own right [...] generates the figure of the spectre.’ (1995, p. 83) 
This does not intend to give ‘materialism’ or Marx’s works a particularly privileged 
theoretical access to political agency. Rather, Jameson argues that it is Derrida’s project to 
investigate the ethical implications of what it means to assert Marxism’s death after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (p. 78): Marx ‘who seemed living, is now dead and buried again, 
what does it mean to affirm this?’ (p. 78) 
Indeed, for Jameson the conceptualisation of the ‘spectre’ intends to provide critical reflection 
upon materialism by making ‘the present waver: like the vibrations of a heat wave through 
which the massiveness of the object world – indeed of matter itself – [shimmers] like a 
mirage.’ (p. 85) It is this commitment to questioning assumptions about the present that 
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suggests for Jameson how Derrida’s conceptualisation of ‘spectrology’ – ‘a wandering 
signifier capable of keeping any number of conspiratorial futures alive’ (p. 109) – offers a 
utopian politics, despite his acknowledgement that Derrida explicitly rejects this concept (pp. 
103-104). Jameson therefore uses ‘spectrology’ as the thread with which he develops 
contiguity between himself, Marx, the disparate ‘discipline’ of Marxism, and Derrida’s 
‘deconstruction’. I now want to argue that this is difficult in light of Jameson and Derrida’s 
respective views on religion, the sacred, and the social. However, I also want to assert that the 
concept of the spectre – of ghostly apparitions and visitations from the past – is also 
significantly synonymous with memory, and that the difficulty of identifying contiguity 
between these authors has a bearing on how we approach this concept. 
Jameson argues that ‘the religion of art [and] the art of religion’ has become interchangeable, 
such that, for example, aesthetic artefacts are given ‘the illusion of substance (of “having 
content”)’ (p. 98). Jameson approaches this via Jean Baudrillard’s theory of ‘simulacra’ – the 
evocation of representation over the necessity or desirability of reality (1991, p. 34) – and 
then modifies this into ‘social simulacra’: the production of a group cultural identity. The 
basis for a postmodern sacred therefore comes into view. However, in addition he proposes 
that this is also manifested in ‘new kinds of representational technology, or at the least (since I 
will want to posit that none of these operations is particularly new) a newly specialized kind 
of aesthetic technology.’ (1995, p. 98)  
Jameson explains that this is in one sense a ‘return’ to older forms of aesthetic ‘sublime,’ but 
also distinct from ‘modernist sublime’ whereby art attempted to evoke that which was 
otherwise absent from view (Edvard Munch’s depiction of alienation in The Scream). 
Building upon his theory of postmodern ‘hysterical sublime’ that I discussed in Chapter Two 
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with regards to Lyotard by combining with the social concept of ‘social simulacra’, he argues 
that we are presented with ‘religious motifs[;] a neo-ethnic pluralism of free choice and the 
free reinvention of small group adherence.’ The contradictory combination of free choice and 
adherence is the reason why ‘religion is once again very much on the agenda of any serious 
attempt to come to terms with the specificity of our own time’. (1995, p. 98)  
Since my thesis has been advocating Jameson’s comparative and utopian approach to cultural 
studies and political and social agency, the question then arises as to how this relates to social 
simulacra and the postmodern sacred. In Postmodernism Jameson situates, like Prakash, 
‘fundamentalism’ with regards to a dialectic between the sacred and the ‘decadent’, and by 
doing so he identifies a sacred element in the representation of ‘high technology’. 
Remembering how Prakash challenges Weber’s claim that modernity demystifies the social, 
Jameson considers how Marxist historical dialectics have celebrated the spectre of religion’s 
demise. For instance: remember ‘the pages of The Communist Manifesto devoted to the 
celebration of the new and historically unique dynamics of capitalism itself.’ (1991, p. 379) 
Yet Jameson argues that there is also an alternative reading of the manifesto that can be 
gleaned that uses the dialectic between feudalism and capitalism and a more particular 
dialectic within this framework of the sacred and the decadent. Jameson proposes that we can 
read the manifesto and the critical importance of these two dialectics as an allegorical 
‘laboratory’, a social, pedagogic space that provides an opportunity for discussion and 
interpolating ideas about change, or warn about developments that are on the horizon, such as 
capitalism; the new ‘structural tendency Marx famously described in terms of separation and 
disjunction, reduction, disaggregation, divestment, and the like.’ (p. 380) 
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It is in this comparative light that I think it best to read Jameson’s claim that Derrida misses 
an important difference between Marx’s views on religion in The German Ideology (1977 
[1846]) and in Capital (1977 [1867]). Derrida claims that Marx’s writings ‘may be tainted as 
a concept by outworn conclusions’ (Derrida in Jameson, 1995, p. 99). However, Jameson 
considers that this fails to consider the way in which Marx’s earlier work attempts to 
specifically gesture towards ‘the institutional relationship […] of state religion to state power’ 
and, most importantly for my thesis, that Marx’s later work with ‘commodity fetishism’ was 
distinct from such a reduction to ideology in its utopian intent that feeds from his paradoxical 
view of capitalism; 
[…] for pre-capitalist societies and modes of production are by definition never 
transparent, since they must assure the extraction of surplus-value by extra-
economic means. [Capitalism] inherited from the triumphant bourgeoisie and 
the great bourgeois revolutions, is the first social form to have eliminated 
religion as such and to have entered on the purely secular vocation of human 
life and human society. Yet according to Marx, religion knows an immediate 
‘return of the repressed’ at the very moment of the coming into being of such a 
secular society, which, imagining that it has done away with the sacred, then at 
once unconsciously sets itself in pursuit of the ‘fetishism of commodities’. The 
incoherency is resolved if we understand that a truly secular society is yet to 
come, lies in the future […]. (p. 100) 
 
Jameson deviates from Derrida because he argues that Marx’s critique of religion and the 
importance of the sacred/decadent dialectic relates to an ambition to remain contingently 
prepared for the future – for agency, and therefore utopian thinking; not a vendetta against 
religion. Indeed, it is important to remember Jameson’s claim that Derrida’s spectrology seeks 
to ask what it means to affirm the death of Marxism, because Jameson suggests that Marx is 
asking the same question about religion. 
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It is in these representational terms that Jameson approaches the question of postmodern 
religion. Firstly he argues that ‘not all [postmodern fundamentalisms] are reactionary – 
witness liberation theology’; referring to a South American Roman Catholic movement that 
called for democracy, resisted poverty, and evoked early Christian communes (1991 p. 388). 
Nonetheless the emphasis upon the representation of content, manifested here by the 
simulation of the past, the basis for ‘social simulacra’, is problematic for him because it 
sustains particular representations to the neglect of agency. 
Furthermore, using social simulacra enables Jameson to identify coherences between religion 
and technology, manifested with his interest in science fiction literature and culture. By 
tracking a dialectic between the sacred and the decadent he identifies ‘high technology’ as an 
aesthetic that relates to the religious concept of the apocryphal. For instance, in the Australian 
film Mad Max (he uses the US title Road Warrior) a post-apocalyptic outback is defined by a 
lack of resources and violent anarchy. He claims that the film obtains its claims to 
significance by operating as a ‘utopian wish fulfilment wrapped in dystopian wolf's clothing’ 
and technological aesthetics of ‘delight with the very breakdown of that machinery.’ (pp. 383-
384) Furthermore, the martyrdom of the character of Kyle Rees in Terminator, having 
conceived of the saviour of mankind is a considerably christological motif. 
However, I believe that a more fundamental break between Jameson and Derrida’s 
approaches to religion and technology is to be found with the latter’s essay Faith and 
Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ (2001 [1996]). In contrast to Jameson’s concern 
with religion in terms of its utopian implications, Derrida approaches it in terms of a concern 
to politically challenge that there are in fact two forms of religion: ‘relegere’ articulating the 
scriptural religion, and ‘religiare’ representing communitarian religion. Applying this to 
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contemporary events, Derrida urges us to remember that ‘Islam is not Islamism and we should 
never forget it’ (p. 46). By distinguishing scripture from community he challenges the notion 
that the opportunity for difference is uprooted by religion. 
Whilst this demonstrates Derrida’s commitment to a future that attempts to leave open the 
possibility of difference, my concern here is the way in which he uses genealogy to make 
claims about the correct and incorrect way to interpret religion. I believe that this resonates 
with the implications of Theodor Adorno’s theory of totally reified society that I discussed in 
Chapter Two, by setting limitations upon the role of social pedagogy and agency. Indeed, 
Derrida argues that whereas ‘relegere’ suggests a scriptural attention to critical reflection – 
‘bringing together in order to return and begin again’ –  ‘religare’ was 
[…] ‘invented by Christians,’ as Benveniste says, and linking religion to the 
link, precisely, to obligation, ligament, and hence to obligation, to debt, etc., 
between men or between man and God. (pp. 73-74) 
As a result Derrida considers that the social aspect of religare should be tracked for the way in 
which it ‘deracinates’ the difference offered by the scriptural, and in this manner I think that 
we return to the issue that Jameson raises regarding Adorno and Horkheimer, touched upon in 
my last chapter: that the social interactivity of culture is not considered in terms of difference. 
Not only does this contradict Jameson’s distinction between aesthetics and culture but also 
Marx’s social theory; in Alienated Labour, for example, that ‘Man is a species-being’ (1977 
[1844], p. 81).  
This does not to diminish the insights that Derrida provides. He uses the social to argue that 
instead of concerning ourselves primarily with Islamist fundamentalism we should consider 
how Abrahamic religion has been globalised by Christian and Latin ‘religare’; that 
‘everything done or said in [the name of ‘religion’] ought to keep the critical memory of this 
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appellation. European, it was first of all Latin.’ (p. 45) It is in this context that he modifies 
globalization into ‘globalatinization’. Indeed, this brings Prakash’s claims that Marathi 
fundamentalism owes more to British colonialism into an interesting relief. Furthermore, 
however, like Jameson he argues that ‘religare’ is not necessarily ‘religious’; it could be 
technological. However, rather than tracing the similarities and differences, he argues that this 
is to be uncovered in a study of the Abrahamic religions, since in Islam, Christianity, and 
Judaism God created the world. Philologically he notes that the ancient Greek word ‘techné’ 
can be translated as origins. 
In this context Derrida argues that technology, like religion, should not be considered in 
negative terms without bearing in mind whether it attempts to assert itself socially or not. 
Such an implementation, he considers, would come to equate to numeric demographics, a 
form of 
Calculability: question, apparently arithmetic, of two, or rather of n + One, 
through and beyond[.] The more than One is this n + One which introduces the 
order of faith or of trust in the address of the other, but also the mechanical, 
machine-like division (testimonial affirmation and reactivity, ‘yes, yes;’ etc., 
answering machine and the possibility of radical evil: perjury, lies, remote-
control murder, ordered at a distance even when it rapes and kills with bare 
hands). (p. 100) 
In doing so he makes a stark warning (written in 1996) about the role of demographics and its 
relationship with globalatinization; what he calls the ‘wars of religion’: 
This question [of demographics] is perhaps the most grave and most urgent for 
the state and the nations of Israel, but it concerns also all the Jews, and 
doubtless also, if less obviously, all the Christians in the world. Not at all 
Muslims today. And to this day, this is a fundamental difference between the 
three original ‘great monotheisms.’ (p. 91) 
The difficulty that I find in this distinction from the scriptural criticality of relegere and 
religare is therefore how it is any less susceptible to calculability, and that we must know, in 
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advance, the true genealogies of religion such as Islam. I believe that this stands in stark 
contrast to inclusiveness of the Marxist laboratory that Jameson offers. 
Conclusion 
Teresa Caldeira’s essay chapter opened this chapter by suggesting the difficulties of 
approaching silencing. Arguing that this operates to the detriment of her historical analysis of 
the discourse of violence, I then headed in the opposite direction with Hilton Judin’s ambition 
to address trauma. However, when he alludes to the sacred and the ritualistic he considers 
them in flux, flux that destabilises the bureaucracy at work preventing people from creating 
new opportunities. Considering his critique of the history of the urban as a concept through 
Raymond Williams, as well as a Williamsian critique of nostalgia and the dominant mode of 
production, I am concerned by his entrepreneurial interest in fragmentation and economic 
expansion of the city. In contrast there is no such concern for economic growth in Prakash’s 
chapter, and I think that he offers a flexible commitment to studying how authority obscures 
difference when he indicates the convergence between contemporary Marathi fundamentalism 
and the British colonial legacy. This distinction between Judin and Prakash is integral to 
reading Jameson’s approach to Derrida. Whilst both authors provide stunning insights into the 
landscape of fundamentalism, and its coherences with technology, I think that Derrida’s 
critique of social thought is highly problematic for my concern to engage in terms of cultural 
and social agency. 
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Conclusion 
Whilst acknowledging that Other Cities, Other Worlds is a collection of writers who have 
different views and methodologies, my ambition has been to contribute to interdisciplinary 
dialogue between critical inquiry into memory and theories of political and social agency 
because of the questions and contributions regarding globalization that travel between these 
academic fields. I have argued in favour of Fredric Jameson’s comparative form of cultural 
inquiry because I believe in the hope that such a utopian political and social theory drives 
towards. I certainly do not believe that Jameson’s writings are always clear or accessible, and 
that along with Theodor Adorno he makes claims that suggest pessimism that require a 
nuanced reading that is not conducive to discursive inclusivity; to the pedagogic laboratory 
that Jameson takes from The Communist Manifesto. More specifically, I think that Jameson 
does indeed fly close to historical determinism that I find problematic in Huyssen’s work. 
However, I also believe that by undertaking such a nuanced close reading an ethical 
commitment can be found to registering cultural forms that have been silenced and those that 
are prevented from gaining a voice in the first place. As such, this is the debate in which I 
would like memory studies to be a part of, and to which I believe many contributions are 
currently being made such be writers such as Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, as 
well as Marianne Hirsch on family and photographic ‘postmemory’ (2008) and Michael 
Rothberg on international ‘multidirectional memory’ (2009) that I wish to engage with in 
future work. 
In Chapter One I considered the role of the urban and started to unpack the differences 
between what I now consider to be aspects of determinism in Huyssen’s approach to 
modernism and Jameson’s comparative and contextual approach with cognitive mapping. 
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This initiates my argument that memory is a fundamental part of Jameson’s utopian project 
because of the way in which it necessarily incorporates rather than rejects narratives that may 
otherwise struggle for empirical verification by so-called experts and scholars. To consider 
these implications in case studies, I initiated my study of the essays of Other Cities, Other 
Worlds by documenting the theoretical tensions between them. 
Yingjin Zhang’s essay was therefore undoubtedly interesting because of the way in which, 
unlike any other text in the collection, it directly engages directly with Jameson’s work by 
challenging the determinism that I identified above. I did not attempt to claim that my reading 
was correct, but instead engage with the implications of a ‘cognitive re-mapping’ that 
attempts to consolidate the significance of polylocality whilst claiming that it operates from 
the level of micro-narratives. In contrast to Zhang and Huyssen, I documented how Ackbar 
Abbas puts forward an investigative approach that asks to scour for the ‘x- marks the spot’ of 
power. As a result, I argued that this flexibility towards power conditions breaks from their 
methodological focus upon modernity and polylocality in broader commitment to context. 
Finally, with Hilton Judin and Gyan Prakash I discussed how the history of the concept and 
name of the ‘urban’ has problematic and complex implications in colonial, post-colonial, 
apartheid, and post-apartheid history because of the way in which it reduced debates and 
facilitated claims to authority. 
I argued that the emphasis that Abbas, Judin, and Prakash place on context and change can be 
carried over to Jameson’s theory of cognitive mapping and expanded because of the way in 
which he emphasises a Williamsian approach to emergent mode of productions and how he 
discusses this in social rather than only political terms. This is not to diminish the vital role of 
political gestures for an ethical commitment to difference – indeed a commitment to the social 
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is often a political gesture – but by also stressing the social I believe that the ‘dominant’ mode 
of production comes to be defused of a necessarily confrontational gesture that can make 
hysterical and bellicose appeals for justice to the detriment of other voices. In this sense, the 
role of articulating spatial dominance can be seen as an opportunity to realise what is different, 
out of view, neglected, or beyond the horizon. By beginning with the question of the urban 
and the spatial I wanted to provide a more cognitively visual introduction to the value of a 
comparative and utopian approach. In the following chapters I moved closer into the 
complexities of memores and imaginaries with debates about changes in postmodern and 
global psychology and the way it effects the possibility of difference, and then to the violent 
entrenchment of fundamentalism. 
I began Chapter Two by considering Huyssen’s strategy of ‘bracketing’. Although this applies 
to the urban as well as to imaginaries, I was concerned at the possibility that the concept has 
an unintended implication of confining political and social agency through the definition of 
what it means to be different. Although Huyssen acknowledges that there are limitations to 
this strategy, he does not describe what these are, and in order to contextualise it within a 
discussion of globalization I considered that this was an important explanatory task that 
should not be treated so lightly.  
Furthermore, however, Huyssen ties bracketing to a concern with modernism. I argued that a 
Jamesonian approach stresses the importance of remaining open to cultural representations in 
the past in order to remain open to creativity in the future, and that as such I do not wish to 
negate the critical importance of modernism. However, I also argued that Jameson’s critical 
reflections on Jean-François Lyotard’s postmodernity thesis suggest an underlying 
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determinism that locks analysis into a binary debate between modernism and postmodernism, 
as well as a debate about the empirical reality of modernity and postmodernity. 
I unpacked this concern by highlighting a difference between AbdouMaliq Simone’s analysis 
of sub-Saharan Africans in Douala, Cameroon, in migration, and within global diaspora 
communities, and Néstor García Canclini’s study of different representations of Mexico City. 
Whilst I found that Simone’s analysis provides insights into pressures and interconnections 
between ideologies; from European colonialism to Femla secret societies and finally to 
diaspora Muslim communities, I argued that the title of his essay - The Last Shall be First - 
indicates an authoritarian presence within his psychological and sociological methodology.  
Simone does not clarify the use of this Biblical citation, and I did not mean to argue that his 
approach is authoritarian because it is Christian. In contrast I was concerned about the 
underlying message that the difficulties that sub-Saharan Africans face provide them with 
experiences which are invaluable for becoming successful entrepreneurs. Even if the title is 
meant to be ironic, it nonetheless seems, to me, to simplify the complexities and challenges 
within their stories. 
In contrast, Canclini works with a concept of imaginaries but does not confine his project to 
defining what these are. Rather, he works with the fractures in cultural representation and I 
believe that this portrays an underlying commitment to dialogue between otherwise disparate 
voices. Like Judin and Prakash in the first chapter, Canclini stretches at the significance of 
modernism and also works with a Benjaminian theory of history to maintain openness 
towards different narratives. 
I therefore argued that Canclini’s essay provides a platform for Jameson’s approach to 
subjectivity and difference. I noted how his ‘third world literature’ thesis has been 
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controversial for the way in which it seems to confine difference to a particular form of 
otherness. However, I argued that third world literature and national allegory attempt to 
remember the ways in which imperialism and colonialism have been manifested aesthetically 
and culturally; memories that a commitment to a different and more inclusive future would 
undoubtedly benefit from. 
Finally, in Chapter Three I addressed how high the stakes can be with memory by considering 
the way in which it can be used to entrench political opinions, and that this can be tracked in 
global repercussions. I began with Theresa Caldeira’s critique of discourses of fear, violence, 
trauma management and politics. I argued that not only does Caldeira’s demand that ‘civic 
society’ be enforced have tautological implications in light of her critique of Brazil’s 
authoritarian legacy, but that her call to silence difficult narratives (even if they are as 
distasteful as Bar Favela) is an exclusionary strategy that is both problematic from a research 
point of view (since Caldeira herself relies upon their articulation for her essay) and more 
importantly from an ethical point of view. 
In contrast, Hilton Judin’s analysis considers that working through traumatic memories is 
vitally important for South African society because it may be the only thing that is shared 
across racial divides. However, I also raised concerns with the intentions behind such a 
project. On the one hand, Judin espouses a concern with the way in which whites remain in 
control of so many instruments of power, and appeals for a united South Africa through 
practical goals rather than hollow idealism. However, on the other hand, he speaks from the 
perspective of an architect and an businessman As such, Judin celebrates the fractures that are 
offered between entrenched and diverse ‘rituals’ as forms of creativity that allow South Africa 
to compete within a global market. Although Judin uses rituals to track these differences, we 
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are, yet again, tied to the framework of modernity and postmodernity that I argued is central 
to Huyssen’s theory of bracketing in Chapter Two. 
In addition to Judin’s emphasis on the sacred, Gyan Prakash focuses his approach to the city 
in terms of the political. With inheritances from Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre he 
considers that politics is the means by which we can track difference, and that the sacred has 
been an important manifestation of this in colonial and post-colonial times. As such he 
considers that in political terms, contemporary Marathi ‘fundamentalism’ shares more in 
common with the spatial authoritarianism of British colonialism than Marathi tradition. 
Although Prakash’s title is ‘The Modern City in Ruins’ his Foucauldian inheritance leads him 
to distance from a linear approach to history. This means that he works with the modernist 
ruins of British colonialism to identify overlaps with Marathi fundamentalism, and by doing 
so he attempts to leave a space for the articulation of voices that respond to such challenges. 
In the last part of this thesis I used the sacred as a means of concluding my argument that 
memory remains significant in Jamesonian terms by considering the way in which he 
incorporates Jacques Derrida’s theory of ‘spectrology’. Since the spectre has synonymous 
qualities with ghosts, spirits, and visitations, I had no doubt that memory can be added to this 
framework. To trace the relationship between a Jamesonian appropriation of spectrology in 
terms of the sacred I looked closer into his relationship with Derrida because of the way in 
which Jameson considers that despite Derrida’s protestations, he does indeed offer a utopian 
approach. By working with this claim I wanted to look closer at what utopian theory means 
under such high stakes. 
With Derrida’s essay on the two origins of ‘religion’ I was confronted with an eerie prediction 
about a world twelve years down the line of America’s long war on terror in light of its 
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publication in 1996: Derrida’s theory of ‘globalatinization’ that would bring the Abrahamic 
religions into demographic conflict due to a genealogical inheritance from Roman 
imperialism. However, by working with this theoretical thread I came to the position that the 
contiguity that Jameson identifies between Derrida, Marx, and himself in terms of the utopian 
is harder to maintain than he suggests. 
Indeed, both Jameson and Derrida theorise the prospect of cohesion between the sacred and 
technology, and neither come to binary conclusions, but whereas Jameson theorises this in 
terms of a utopian Marxist commitment to the possibility of political as well as cultural and 
social agency, indicated in his critical response to Adorno and Horkheimer’s culture industry 
thesis in which he identifies the social limitations of an aesthetic analysis, I documented how 
Derrida places the cultural and the social at the heart of the uprooting of difference - and 
globalatinization. In contrast, I argued that Jameson’s social commitment, inherited from 
Marx, is open to the possibility of futurity in community and not just scripture. 
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